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We argue that the concept of goal neglect can be fruitfully applied to 
understand children’s potential problems in experimental tasks and real-world 
settings. We describe an assessment of goal neglect developed for administration to 
preschool children, and report data on two measures derived from this task alongside 
the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) and an Opposite-colour response-
inhibition task. The propensity to neglect initial task cues was uniquely linked to 
response-inhibition, while neglect of a later cue was uniquely linked to the DCCS. 
Additional evidence suggests that recovery from neglect can occur, and shows that 
goal neglect varies with the cognitive transparency of the signifying cue. Data 
demonstrate the importance of, and place constraints on, current theories of 
information-regulation, and foreground the notion of graded representations in 
working memory and executive functioning.  
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When knowledge is not enough: the phenomenon of goal neglect in preschool 
children 
 
The hallmark of the cognitive revolution, to the extent that it existed 
(Greenwood, 1997; Leahey, 1992), has been the specification of information-
processing models. Broadbent (1958) exemplified this approach, attempting to 
capture the flow of information from the point when stimuli initially make an 
impression on sensory registers through to response actions. More recently, however, 
cognitive psychology has increasingly focused on information-regulation, considering 
the mechanisms for controlling mental representations and higher order goals. Whilst 
part of the information-processing approach, this more recent emphasis recognises the 
potential for both endogenous and exogeneous influences to modulate behaviour. 
Information-regulation is partly synonymous with “executive functions” 
(Lehto, Juujarvi, Kooistra, & Pulkkinen, 2003; Miyake et al., 2000). These include, 
for example, the ability to withhold responses to stimuli that would otherwise be 
produced because of prior associations. Our contention, however, is that such 
regulation can only occur when behavioural goals or plans are represented with 
sufficient completeness and strength. That is, goals must be properly represented and 
functionally available so that cognition can be regulated towards their 
accomplishment (see also Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997). This forms an 
under-researched area, and we seek to understand better the processes involved in 
young children’s goal representation by studying instances of goal neglect. 
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With reference to adult goal-directed behaviour, Duncan, Emslie, Williams, 
Johnson & Freer (1996) proposed the term goal neglect, “to describe disregard of a 
task requirement, even though it has been understood.” (p. 265). This concept was 
argued to be relevant to the behaviour of frontal patients, for whom “there is a 
mismatch between what is known of task requirements and what is attempted in 
behaviour” (ibid).  Duncan et al. (1996) asked adults to perform a speeded monitoring 
task with a number of sub-elements. Participants were directed by a central cue 
(“WATCH LEFT” or “WATCH RIGHT”) to one of two locations on a computer 
screen and within a rapidly changing sequence they attempted to identify letters whilst 
ignoring digits. A second central but abstract cue (a plus or minus symbol) briefly 
appeared and directed participants to one or other stimulus streams. Duncan et al. 
found goal activation failure among some participants; the second cue - the second-
side-instruction – was systematically ignored when it called for a change in 
monitoring location, even though participants knew that they should respond to the 
cue. 
We are not aware of published research that has directly mapped the concept 
and paradigm of goal neglect to the behaviour of preschool children. This is 
potentially an important lacuna. The goal neglect paradigm combines the 
‘endogenous’ selective control of behaviour towards an experimentally defined goal 
together with a seemingly sporadic ‘exogenous’ cue in the form of the symbolic 
second-side-instruction. Added impetus for investigating whether and why children 
might show goal neglect comes from developmental arguments that representations 
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are not all-or-none, but vary continuously in their strength (e.g., Munakata, Morton & 
Yerys, 2003). This approach suggests that there is more to the implementation of 
goals than their representation per se. Moreover, there is plentiful anecdotal evidence 
that children are sometimes unsuccessful when asked to carry out prospective actions 
at particular times (when such and such happens, do X). They may ignore the 
instruction at the point of performance. This adds further weight to the possibility that 
goal neglect may represent an important concept for cognitive development. 
Moreover, there is a striking potential overlap with an independent theoretical 
framework that has been intensively investigated, the Cognitive Complexity and 
Control (CCC) model of development. CCC theory is also fundamentally concerned 
with explaining “dissociations between action and explicit knowledge” (Zelazo, Frye 
& Rapus, 1996, p. 37) offering an explanation for “situations in which children act 
inappropriately despite knowing what to do” (ibid., p. 38).   
CCC theory has been articulated with respect to the Dimensional Change Card 
Sort (DCCS). Children sort bivalent cards into one of two trays, with the sorting 
criteria changing half way through the task from one dimension to another  (e.g. from 
sorting by colour to sorting by shape). Children are made aware of the change in the 
sorting dimension, and they generally display good knowledge of the new ‘sorting 
rules’ if they are verbally interrogated. Despite this, 3-year-olds typically struggle to 
sort cards correctly by the post-switch rules, a process that is eventually mastered by 
the age of 5. According the CCC theory, “an increase in complexity between 3 and 5 
years of age permits children to use a higher order rule to determine which of two 
 6 
incompatible rules to use. In the card sort task, 3-year-olds know the preswitch rules; 
they also know the postswitch rules. However, in the absence of a higher order rule 
that operates on these two rule pairs, 3-year-olds cannot make a deliberate decision 
about which rule pair to use and they persist in using the rules that are most strongly 
associated with the task.” (ibid., p.41). This view has been supported in later work 
(see Zelazo, Müller, Frye & Marcovitch, 2003). 
At one level, goal neglect and DCCS paradigms represent very similar 
phenomena: knowledge about task requirements in general is not translated into 
appropriate behaviour at the specific point at which it is required. However, the 
theoretical accounts are rather different. Duncan et al. (1996) suggest that goal neglect 
arises from the failure to represent the mapping between cues and actions with 
sufficient saliency (and Kane, Conway, Hambrick & Engle, in press, link adult goal 
maintenance to working memory capacity; see also Marcovitch, Boseovski & Knapp, 
in press). Zelazo and Frye (1998), in contrast, argue that DCCS errors occur when 
children cannot embed rule sets into a hierarchical structure. There are alternatives to 
this embedded rule account, that focus instead on the sequential demands of moving 
from one task phase to another (e.g. Kirkham, Cruess & Diamond, 2003; Munakata & 
Yerys, 2001; Perner & Lang, 2002; Towse, Redbond, Houston-Price & Cook, 2000). 
However, these different explanations often make overlapping predictions for DCCS 
performance, which highlight the value of complementary paradigms. 
This discrepancy between a shared descriptive language but different 
theoretical viewpoints generates a potentially powerful opportunity. Of course, there 
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are substantial differences in studied populations, in the tasks used, and the conceptual 
contexts relevant to the two paradigms. Nonetheless there is theoretical leverage to be 
gained by investigating whether goal neglect and DCCS actually involve just 
superficially similar concepts, or whether instead they share some commonality. In 
particular, the DCCS was developed with respect to the requirements of hierarchical 
rule embedding (If it is the colour game, and if it is a red card, then…). However, the 
adult goal neglect task requires participants to orient their attentional focus in 
response to an arbitrary cue independently of preceding instructions. Finding a 
relationship between these two tasks would therefore emphasise the relevance of goal 
maintenance and implementation as being at least a contributory factor in DCCS 
performance.  
Since the response to a goal-relevant cue involves a change from one mode of 
behaviour to another ‘mid stream’, we entertained the possibility that inhibitory 
control is important to prevent perseverative persistence of the existing task set. 
Inhibitory control may also be important to guide attention on the basis of a transient 
cue, for example to prevent responding to preferred rather than target stimuli, or 
prevent responding to all stimuli instead of being selective. Therefore, we also 
administered a Stroop-like inhibitory response task (Simpson & Riggs, 2005) to 
provide a further measure of executive functioning. 
Modifications to the goal neglect paradigm were necessary to make the task 
developmentally appropriate. We specifically developed the selective image naming 
task as an environment for assessing children. We slowed the pace down (though 
 8 
preschool children nonetheless commented that events occurred quickly), reduced the 
number of stimuli and tried to make the task more motivating (the objective was to 
help a teddy bear find food rather than have participants respond to stimulus class; 
stimuli were images of objects rather than alphanumeric symbols). The original task 
involved incomplete responses; participants reported some stimuli and ignored others. 
Pilot work suggested that preschool children encountered problems with the need to 
combine object classification with response decision, and we thus used stimuli that 
were always potential responses.  
We nonetheless preserved core elements of the original, adult, goal-neglect 
task: in the initial test session, following a centrally presented cue, participants 
selectively attended off-centre to several screen events. Then a different (and abstract) 
centrally presented cue appeared that directed participants to attend to one or other 
stimulus stream. On most (67%) trials this second cue involved a change in the 
location for the subsequent stimuli. On the remaining trials, the cue maintained the 
location that was already specified. Events occurred at an externally-paced, regular, 
rhythm.  
In a subsequent stage of the study conducted with a subset of children1, all 
experimental trials involved a second–side-instruction that required a switch in the 
target stimulus location. This was a potentially harder configuration since goal neglect 
                                     
1 Testing carried over into the summer vacation period and some 
children were away for this phase. All available children were 
tested. 
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always produces errors. It allowed a focus on children’s goal maintenance for the 
second-side-instruction ‘rule’ because it consistently cued a change in what is 
required of children. This stage of the experiment was designed to address two 
important issues. First, trials explore the impact of task experience on preschoolers’ 
goal neglect. Duncan et al. (1996) reported that across blocks of contiguous trials 
where participants were reminded of task requirements, recovery from neglect 
occurred. Goal neglect errors were therefore not inevitable and permanent. Given that 
children also have the instructions explained to them again their performance might 
improve too.  
Second, trials were designed to examine the relative efficacy of the two types 
of instruction cue – an abstract patch of colour vs. a more directive arrow. Duncan et 
al. (1996) described one experiment in which, in addition to the second-side-
instruction signal, there was an occasional dot probe that appeared above or below the 
alphanumeric stimuli. Participants responded by pressing one of two alternative keys 
(for high or low dot positions). Neglect of the dot response occurred although there 
was ‘spontaneous’ behavioural recovery across trials. Duncan et al. speculated that 
the nature of the cue (a dot located in a high or low position, relative to the abstract 
“+” or “-“ second-side-instruction symbol) influenced the effectiveness of goal 
activation. That is, participants’ tendency to act on a goal-related cue may be related 
to the transparency or affordance of the stimuli. The mapping between the dot cue and 
the response was more transparent and consequently, easier to implement as a 
behaviour. We tested whether goal neglect is influenced by how strongly the stimulus 
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specifies the appropriate response. In the first session, the first-side-instruction was 
always an arrow and the second-side-instruction was a coloured square. In the 




Participants & Materials 
 
Thirty-four children participated from 3 preschool groups with a mean age of 
49 months (SD=6.6 months, ranging 36 to 59 months, 16 girls and 18 boys). Parental 
consent was sought according to preschool procedures. An Apple Macintosh 
Powerbook G4 (running PsyScript, an experiment generation environment) controlled 
the SINT. Laminated sheets, cards and two black trays were used for the response-
inhibition and DCCS tasks (for full details of DCCS materials, see Towse et al., 2000 
Experiment 3). In the final session a sub-sample of 15 children completed additional 
trials of the selective image naming task (mean age for this group of 8 girls and 7 
boys was 46.5 months [SD=6.85], range 36 -58 months). 
 
Procedure 
In the first test session the Experimenter introduced himself and invited 
children to play a game on a laptop computer. The game revolved around “Bobo”, a 
hungry teddy bear shown on screen. Children were asked to help Bobo, who was 
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looking for food in one of two houses. The houses appeared as blue and red outlines 
on the left and right of the screen respectively. The experimenter explained that Bobo 
used a centrally placed (right- or left-facing) arrow and a (blue or red) square to tell 
children which house he had gone to (these cues formed what Duncan et al., 1996, 
term the first-side-instruction, and second-side-instruction respectively. In other 
words, they specified the target response location at the start of the trial and during the 
trial, respectively). An initial example of each cue was shown to allow children to 
report verbally where Bobo would be, and examples of food pairs gave them the 
opportunity to identify just the target food for Bobo (children were told that Bobo 
would become confused if they named food in the other house). Finally, children were 
prompted to re-confirm that they knew the relevant task rules before experimental 
trials began. 
The red and blue houses were visible throughout each experimental trial. Each 
trial began with the first-side-instruction arrow cue that appeared for 2 seconds, 
followed by a 1 second gap. Subsequently 5 food pairs appeared. Each pair contained 
two different food items shown simultaneously, with one food item shown inside each 
house for 2.5 seconds in sequence without gaps. The second-side-instruction colour 
cue then appeared for 2 seconds (with a 0.5 second gap, maintaining the pace of 
delivery) followed by 3 further food pairs at the same pace as before2. Figure 1 
presents a schematic, annotated, diagram of the event sequence. There were 18 food 
                                     
2 These values report the programmed presentation rate. Actual times would have 
been marginally slower because of software delays, but these are negligible. 
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stimulus images, obtained from multiple sources (including public test libraries and 
Internet sites) and scaled to the same size. The computer sampled these images 
without replacement until exhaustion, and then resampled the pool. 
Children completed 9 trials forming 3 sub-blocks. The experimenter initiated 
every trial, permitting momentary pauses and encouragement. There was an additional 
interval after 6 trials, with visual feedback comprising Bobo surrounded by food. 
Experimental sequences included a second-side-instruction that involved either a cue 
to shift monitoring location (a ‘switch’ trial) or a cue to maintain the search location 
(a ‘stay’ trial). Each block involved 1 stay trial and 2 switch trials, randomly ordered. 
In a second session, carried out a few days after the first, children completed 
the red-blue inhibitory and DCCS tasks, in randomized order. We administered a 
standard DCCS procedure (Zelazo et al., 1996) using stimuli presented by Towse et 
al. (2000), Experiment 3. Children played a ‘cats and birds’ and ‘reds and greens’ 
game, in different orders, sorting six test cards into one of two trays according to a 
shape or colour rule. The experimenter reminded children of the rules, test cards were 
labeled for children, and they were sorted face down. The second rule set required 
children to reverse the sorting responses for the test cards. As is typical, after sorting 
the final card, children were asked two knowledge questions concerning the post-
switch rules. 
Ten trials of the red-blue inhibitory task adapted the procedure of Simpson & 
Riggs (2005; see Oh, 2006). Children played a “silly game”, in which the 
experimenter named a colour, and they touched the opposite colour box on a 
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laminated sheet in front of them. Thus, with the hand resting on a marked location, if 
they heard the word “blue”, they were to touch the red box, and vice versa. They were 
then to return to start location, whereupon the experimenter identified the next word. 
In a third session 1-3 weeks later, some children completed further test trials 
on the selective image naming task. These participants were re-invited to help Bobo 
on the computer. The task was explained again in full. Each of 6 trials involved, as 
before, a first-side-instruction, five pairs of food images, a second-side-instruction, 
and then three further pairs of food images. Trials used the same stimulus set and 
occurred at the same pace as before. However, all second-side-instructions cued a 
location switch. Three trials used an initial arrow signal and a subsequent square 
signal, and three trials used an initial square signal and a subsequent arrow signal; the 
software compiled, for each child, a random order in which to present these six trials. 
 
Results  
Adult goal neglect typically focuses on participants’ failure to respect the 
second-side-instruction and change monitoring location (Duncan et al., 1996). 
However, the failure to implement all task relevant instructions can be observed in 
different ways. Here, we noted two relevant response patterns on each trial. First, 
whether a child failed to identify correctly the target stimuli on the majority of the 
five stimuli pairs following the first-side-instruction. Second, we noted whether a 
child failed to identify correctly the target stimuli on the majority of the three stimuli 
pairs following the second-side-instruction. Thus, there were two types of goal 
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neglect reflecting different phases of the task. This pass / fail scoring threshold – 
based on behaviour with respect to the majority of stimulus pairs – mirrors the 
criterion used by Duncan et al., 1996. Choosing a non-target stimulus, reporting both 
stimulus pairs, or failure to respond all constituted goal-directed behavioural lapses 
(of which the most common was the failure to respond). We also scored performance 
in terms of the number of behavioural lapses to every stimulus pair following each 
location cue. However, this alternative (specific) measure correlated very highly with 
the (global) number of trial errors with respect to the first-side-instruction 
(r(32)=.947, p<.001) and second-side-instruction, (r(32)=.808, p<.001)3. We therefore 
report the original global measure in the analyses that follow. 
In the first session, children completed 9 trials in 3 sub-blocks of the selective 
image naming task. Since our focus is on failures to follow all the task instructions, 
we express scores in terms of error frequency. The mean number of error trials (goal 
inappropriate behaviour in response to either the first-side-instruction or second-side-
instruction) out of three in each sub-block was 1.3 (SD=1.2), 1.0 (SD=1.08), and 1.3 
(SD=1.12). It is apparent that at the level of group performance, children were able to 
complete some, but not all trials. The mean number of errors in response to the first-
side-instruction and second-side-instruction separately was 1.85 (SD=1.96) and 1.75 
(SD=1.56) respectively. Overall performance did not differ across sub-block, 
                                     
3 We also found a strong association between the failure to respond and the total 
number of errors, r(32)=.824, p<.001, confirming the representativeness of the overall 
measure. 
 15 
F(2,66)=2.60, p=.082, ηp2=.145. Age was not a reliable associate of error frequency, 
r(32)=-.181, p=.304.  
The DCCS was measured in terms of sorting accuracy using the first set of 
(preswitch) rules and the second set of (postswitch) rules (adopting a failure threshold 
of least 2/6 test cards). As is commonplace, DCCS performance then indicates 
whether children succeed on both pre- and post-switch phases, or fail on at least one 
phase4; all children of the latter type answered knowledge questions correctly. For 
alignment with the selective image naming task, the score on the red-blue inhibitory 
task reflected the number of incorrect responses (out of 10). Children who 
experienced card sorting difficulties made more mistakes on the red-blue inhibitory 
task (M=5.14, SD=3.94) than the children who succeeded (M=2.75, SD=3.27), a 
difference that was marginally significant, t(32)=1.93, p=.063, η2=.104. 
Overall, error frequency on the red-blue inhibitory task correlated with the 
number of error trials on the selective image naming task, r(32)=.663, p<.001 and 
more specifically correlated with the frequency of neglect to both the first- and 
second-side-instruction (r(32)=.71, p<.001, and r(32)=.36, p=.036 respectively). 
Subsequent analysis revealed a dissociation between these two phases of the task. 
Red-blue inhibitory task errors correlated with first-side-instruction neglect after 
partialling out second-side-instruction neglect, r(31)=.67, p<.001, but not second-
side-instruction neglect after partialling out first-side-instruction neglect, r(31)=.18, 
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p=.328. This pattern of results is repeated when one also partials out the possible 
mediating role of age. Figure 2 shows that a dissociation is also found between task 
phases when one partials out the influence of age and the DCCS. 
Overall, problems on the DCCS correlated5 with the number of error trials on 
the selective image naming task too, rpb(32)=.52, p=.002 and also correlated with the 
frequency of neglect to the first- and second-side-instruction (rpb(32)=.37, p=.024 and 
rpb(32)=.52, p=.002 respectively). The two phases of the selective image naming task 
were again dissociated, but the pattern was now reversed. DCCS problems did not 
correlate significantly with first-side-instruction neglect after partialling out second-
side-instruction neglect, rpb(31)=.24, p=.174 but did correlate with second-side-
instruction neglect after partialling out first-side-instruction neglect, rpb(31)=.45, 
p=.009 (age did not mediate these effects). Figure 2 shows the differential pattern of 
associations holds also when one partials out age and the red-blue inhibitory task. 
In summary, red-blue inhibitory errors correlate uniquely with neglect of the 
first signal, while DCCS problems correlate uniquely with neglect of the second 
signal. While the frequency of neglect to the first and second signals correlated 
overall, r(32)=.37, p=.029, they evidently tap different regulatory functions.  
Moreover, given that each phase of goal neglect correlates with a separate external 
                                                                                                       
4 One child produced unusual performance, failing preswitch but passing postswitch 
trials: yet analysis based on postswitch failures alone produces the same result profile. 
5 Since DCCS performance is dichotomous, these are point-biserial 
correlations. 
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measure, the dissociations in correlations cannot be attributed to differential 
reliability.  
The first session comprised (nine) trials of the selective image naming task in 
which the second signal either cued a location change or no change. The final session 
involved fewer (six) trials but they always involved switches. Despite this 
configuration, children’s performance was better on the second assessment. In the 
first session failures occurred on 45% of trials for the relevant sample of children; this 
fell to 21% on the final session. This improvement was significant, t(14)=2.51, 
p=.025, η2=.382. The correlation between the previous and current performance was 
quantitatively substantial, but not significant with the current sample size, r(13)=.39, 
p=.185 (the improved performance in the final session may have contributed to 
restricted variability). 
Analysis of goal compliance confirmed the relevance of cue type. Table 1 
shows that children were more prone to behavioural lapses when the coloured square 
rather than the arrow provided the first-side-instruction or the second-side-instruction. 
Combining the lapses following the first and second signal, there were significantly 
more task-related failures associated with the coloured square signal than the arrow, 
t(14)=2.17, p=.048, η2=.252. Thus the stimulus cues differed in their potency for 




We argue that the current implementation of a child-appropriate goal neglect 
task, the selective image naming task, is useful and tractable. Some, but not all, 
children succeed at the experimenter paced, computer-based task. It is challenging, 
but not beyond the capacity of all preschoolers. Moreover, the test environment is 
sufficiently engaging that young children will undertake a number of somewhat 
similar trials – over more than one session. The data establish that separable and 
indeed complementary components underlie performance, by virtue of the 
dissociations in correlations with different stages of the task.  
The data show that second-side-instruction neglect was not uniquely linked to 
the response inhibition task. However, we do not take this to mean that responding to 
this signal does not involve inhibition. Just as there are varieties of executive 
functions (Miyake et al., 2000; Towse & Houston-Price, 2001), we recognize that 
inhibition is not a uni-dimensional construct (Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Nigg, 2000). 
We suggest, therefore, that goal neglect to the second-side-instruction is just more 
strongly related to the ability to shift instructional set than to response inhibition.  
In the final session children’s performance improved; they made fewer errors 
even though all the trials involved location switches. This is actually consistent with 
Duncan et al. (1996), who showed adults’ recovery from goal neglect following 
feedback and prompting. Since the task was explained again in full prior to the 
experimental trials, we effectively reminded children of all the task goals. We 
conclude that this helped prompt them to attend to the location signals although we 
note two further contributory issues. First, children would have been more familiar 
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with the Experimenter and materials, which may have facilitated performance. 
Second, since all second-side-instructions mandated a location switch so as to provide 
a stronger test of goal maintenance the consistent mapping between instructions may 
have increased the salience of the later cue for children6 although adherence to the 
first-side-instruction improved in the final session too. Whatever the cause the 
performance improvement echoes the conclusion from Duncan et al. (1996) that 
neglect does not mean individuals are incapable of implementing the goal, merely that 
they do not do so. This in turn suggests a possible link with research on children’s 
production deficiencies (e.g. Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1990) where a strategy is not 
elicited even though children can be shown to be able to produce it. 
The study also confirms that the configuration of the stimulus item is relevant 
to the implementation of goal directed behaviour. An arrow is a less abstract cue than 
a coloured square for attentional selectivity.  We suggest that the arrow offers a more 
direct or leading signal to children to respond to just one of a pair of visual images. 
These results echo the deployment of a dot probe task by Duncan et al. (1996), and 
they endorse the notion from Munakata, O’Reilly & Morton (in press) that children’s 
mental representations take graded rather than absolute values. That is, it is not 
sufficient simply to have a mental representation, per se. Instead one requires a 
sufficiently strong representation combined with a suitable exogenous signal so as to 
affect information processing. In this context, an arrow is stronger than a colour (a 
                                     
6 Duncan et al. (1996) similarly note that drawing attention to the goal requirements 
can affect task success. 
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description that is consistent with, for example, the perspective from natural and 
conventional symbols in Hala & Russell, 2001). 
To succeed on the selective image naming task, children must implement a 
number of goal relevant behaviours. In the first phase of the task, they must encode 
and represent the initial signal. They must also look at the relevant spatial location 
and report just the stimulus that appears there. Children sometimes gave no report at 
all, and sometimes they reported the inappropriate stimulus instead of or as well as the 
target. Inhibiting the temptation to respond to the visual onset of stimuli (choosing to 
respond selectively instead), or allowing attention to be captured by object onsets, 
may contribute to the association with the red-blue inhibitory task. 
Subsequent task behaviour – whether children take appropriate account of the 
second signal, a colour patch – is linked instead with the DCCS. We suggest that both 
tasks require adequate representations of the relevant goal state (the implications of 
the second-side-instruction in the former task or the change in rules in the latter). This 
association addresses one of the important questions motivating the present work; the 
apparently similar language in describing dissociations between behaviour and action 
in the DCCS and goal neglect paradigms is more than coincidental. We argue that 
both paradigms emphasise how knowledge itself is not enough to produce goal-
directed behaviour (see also Marcovitch et al., in press).  To be effective, internal 
goals in the selective image naming task must be activated and salient, while the 
external eliciting signals must also be encoded and appropriately mapped onto those 
goal representations.  
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A comparison of the two tasks may well help to reveal patterns of 
performance in each. There is likely to be an important dynamic between the 
endogenous representations of a goal and the exogenous stimuli that are relevant to it, 
such that some external cues have greater imperative force than others, as found in the 
final session. This implies that both the selective image naming task and DCCS place 
demands on the adequate representation of the goal state. In the former, children need 
to do more than notice the colour patch. They must translate its significance (red = 
report images in the red house, blue= report images in the blue house), as well as 
often overcome any inertia or perseveration merely to report from the current stimulus 
location. They must also maintain the goal of reporting the target object rather than 
fall back to a more passive monitoring state.  
Mapping this perspective onto DCCS performance, one might propose that 
children need to do more than learn the new rule information (e.g,, if the card is a car, 
it must be placed in the right-hand tray). Children must represent the now-relevant 
dimension in the test cards (that the card is a ‘car’), as well as overcome any inertia or 
perseveration to use preswitch sorting patterns (such as thinking about the card in 
terms of colour). This line of thinking does not rule out a CCC explanation in terms of 
embedded task rules, yet it focuses on the possibility that DCCS success depends on 
children making good their understanding of what test cards signify (Kirkham et al., 
2003; Towse et al., 2000). It is therefore especially compatible with the view that 
children’s representations in the goal neglect and DCCS tasks are graded, not all or 
none. Just as Munakata, et al. (in press) argue that DCCS information may be 
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represented at a level sufficient for responses to direct questioning but insufficient for 
their deployment on sorting trials themselves when conflict is present, the present 
evidence suggests that some cues may be sufficient to trigger behaviors whilst other 
cues –for the same behavior –do not. 
In conclusion, we argue that studying goal neglect, via the selective image 
naming task, provides valuable insights to the production of goal-directed behaviour 
in young children. The present data demonstrate that task performance can be 
coherent, interpretable, and multi-faceted. Performance on this task can help to 
advance our theoretical and conceptual understanding of the organization of 
representations, and raise a number of questions for future research to address.  The 
results illustrate the potential of the paradigm to constrain theories about the 
regulation of information-processing, and complement existing techniques for 
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Table 1. Frequency of behavioural lapses in the second administration of the 
selective image naming task as a function of cue type and task phase. Standard 
deviations in parentheses. 
___________________________________________ 
Response to the first-side-instruction  
Arrow signal     .20 (.41) 
Colour signal     .47 (.99) 
 
Response to the second-side-instruction 
Arrow signal     .33 (.73) 






Figure 1. Schematic representation of the sequence of events in the Selective 
Image Naming Task. FSI = First Side Instruction; SSI = Second Side Instruction. 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between the selective image naming task and other 
Executive Function tasks. Variables depicted with broken lines (e.g. children’s age) 
represent those partialled out of the specified association. SINT FSI = compliance 
with the first-side-instruction in the selective image naming task; SINT SSI = 
compliance with the second-side-instruction in the selective image naming task. 
Asterisks represent significant associations. 
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